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Gramsci at the margins: subjectivity and subalternity in a theory of hegemony
Abstract
In strictly political terms, the Gramscian concept of subalternity applies to those groups in society who
are lacking autonomous political power. In Gramsci’s time these groups were easily identified, and much
of the work around the concept of subalternity has centred on groups like peasants and the proletariat.
But Gramsci also argued that subalternity existed on a broader scale than this, including people from
different religions or cultures, or those existing at the margins of society. This aspect of Gramsci’s work is
often overlooked, because many writers are interested in Gramsci’s political theory, which they use to
analyse the way in which capitalism, as a structural system, has become hegemonic over time. The focus
here is on the history of organised groups and their organised struggle. Hence, the emphasis is largely on
white, male-oriented institutions of power. But Gramsci argued that hegemony did not exist merely at this
level. Rather, he argued that hegemony comes from below, originating in the thoughts, beliefs and actions
of everyday people who may or may not see themselves as part of organised groups. Hence, Gramsci
was intensely aware of the way hegemony operated at a personal level. Capitalist hegemony was not, is
not, possible, without a complete identification at the level of the self. This paper seeks to expand on
some of Gramsci’s thinking in this area, in an attempt to understand the connections between the self and
society in a theory of hegemony, where hegemony is considered a process based on leadership, rather
than a state built on domination. It is through an analysis of what hegemonic processes exclude (or make
subaltern), that we can expand our understanding of how hegemony works, and of how it may be resisted.
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In strictly political terms, the Gramscian concept of subalternity applies to those
groups in society who are lacking autonomous political power. In Gramsci’s time these
groups were easily identified, and much of the work around the concept of subalternity has
centred on groups like peasants and the proletariat. But Gramsci also argued that subalternity
existed on a broader scale than this, including people from different religions or cultures, or
those existing at the margins of society. This aspect of Gramsci’s work is often overlooked,
because many writers are interested in Gramsci’s political theory, which they use to analyse
the way in which capitalism, as a structural system, has become hegemonic over time. The
focus here is on the history of organised groups and their organised struggle. Hence, the
emphasis is largely on white, male-oriented institutions of power. But Gramsci argued that
hegemony did not exist merely at this level. Rather, he argued that hegemony comes from
below, originating in the thoughts, beliefs and actions of everyday people who may or may
not see themselves as part of organised groups. Hence, Gramsci was intensely aware of the
way hegemony operated at a personal level. Capitalist hegemony was not, is not, possible,
without a complete identification at the level of the self. This paper seeks to expand on some
of Gramsci’s thinking in this area, in an attempt to understand the connections between the
self and society in a theory of hegemony, where hegemony is considered a process based on
leadership, rather than a state built on domination. It is through an analysis of what
hegemonic processes exclude (or make subaltern), that we can expand our understanding of
how hegemony works, and of how it may be resisted.

Hegemony as process
The term hegemony has recently come to be synonymous with the idea of the
domination of one group over another, especially in the field of international relations.2 It is
also most frequently linked to Gramsci’s work on the political relations emerging out of the
revolutionary ferment of early twentieth century Europe.3 Yet these are not the only contexts
1

The author gratefully acknowledges the helpful comments of the anonymous reviewers which provided much
food for thought.
2
The amount of work in this field is large – some examples include Cox R. W. (1993). "Gramsci, hegemony
and international relations: an essay in method." Cambridge Studies in International Relations 26, Gill S., Ed.
(1993). Gramsci, historical materialism and International Relations. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
Chomsky N. (2003). Hegemony or survival: America's quest for global dominance. Allen and Unwin, Sydney,
Agnew J. A. (2005). Hegemony: the new shape of global power. Temple University Press, Philadelphia.
3
Some examples of this work include Anderson P. (1976). "The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci." New Left
Review 1(100): 5-78, Mouffe C., Ed. (1979). Gramsci and Marxist Theory. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London,
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in which Gramsci deployed the term, and more often than not it is now used in ways that are
far removed from the original complexity with which Gramsci developed the concept. While
it is true that there is no one place in which Gramsci defined and developed the term, nor is
there one articulation of a ‘theory of hegemony’ as a coherent whole, it is the case that the
concept informs most of Gramsci’s wide-ranging philosophical, political and cultural prison
writings. Early in the Prison Notebooks he gives a clear indication of how he understands
hegemony operating:
The politico-historical criterion on which our own inquiries must be grounded is this: that a
class is dominant in two ways, namely it is leading and dominant. It leads the allied classes, it
dominates the opposing classes. Therefore, a class can (and must) lead even before assuming
power; when it is in power it becomes dominant but it also continues to lead (Gramsci 1992:
136-137. Q1§44).
This emphasis on leadership stems from the term’s original meaning of which Gramsci was
clearly aware (Fontana 2000: 304-306). Fontana suggests that the key to understanding
Gramsci’s conception of hegemony lies in the use of the Ancient Greek ‘hēgemoniā’ (or
‘egemonia’ in Italian) meaning leadership4, as different and distinct from domination
(Williams 1960; Fontana 2000: 308-309). This does not mean that Gramsci used one
definition of the term consistently; in fact he appears to use it in several different ways and on
several different levels which sometimes appear to contradict each other (Fontana 2000: 3078, 315). Given this, it is an almost pointless task to attempt to unravel this complexity and
come up with one categorical definition. However, for the purposes of this paper a particular
conception of hegemony is necessary if we wish to more deeply understand the connection
between the individual and society. In this sense, a conception of hegemony that provides a
framework of analysis that does not depend on deterministic categories, especially when it
comes to the problematic of consciousness and subjectivity, is essential. Gramsci’s theory of
hegemony makes this possible when we conceive of it as a process, and based in civil society.
The idea that the theory of hegemony is process-oriented is implicit in the dialectic approach
which pervades the Prison Notebooks in both its method and content. The exact nature of
Gramsci’s dialectical method is a matter of debate (Finocchiaro 1988) however it is most
evident in his insistence on understanding the relationships between objects of analysis to
critique the basis of knowledge (Howson 2005: 15). The notion of hegemony as a process is
also implicit in his rejection of deterministic economism; if lived experience is not simply
determined by the categories of social analysis as imposed by abstract and idealist theorising,

Adamson W. (1980). Hegemony and revolution: a study of Antonio Gramsci's political and cultural theory.
University of California Press, Berkeley, Sassoon A. S. (1980). Gramsci's Politics. Croom Helm, London,
Femia J. V. (1981). Gramsci's Political Thought: Hegemony, Consciousness and the Revolutionary Process.
Clarendon Press, Oxford, Holub R. (1992). Antonio Gramsci: Beyond Marxism and Postmodernism. Routledge,
London: New York.
4
It should be noted that most dictionaries do still use ‘leadership’ as the definition of hegemony, while others
use dominance, or influence, especially of one state over another. Regardless, all dictionary entries consulted
here refer the root of the word back to the Greek hegemonia, meaning leadership. Dictionaries consulted:
Macquarie Concise Dictionary, the Oxford English Dictionary and the Compact Oxford English Dictionary
Online, which interestingly defines hegemony simply as dominance.
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then the theory of hegemony necessarily implies a conception of ‘reality’ constructed through
multiplicity and indeterminacy.
For Gramsci, the practice of hegemony is nothing other than the waging of a war of position
(Howson 2005: 129). If Gramsci’s main thematic concern was an understanding of the
philosophy of praxis, then the conception of hegemony developed in the Prison Notebooks
stems from his consideration of the failures of revolutionary Marxism. He saw clearly that a
frontal assault on the state bought only disaster, in fact it served only to reinforce and
strengthen the repressive apparatus (Gramsci 1971: 229-246; Gramsci 1992: 217-220 Q1
§133, 134). The war of position, in contrast to the frontal assault or ‘war of manoeuvre’, is
“the whole organisational and industrial system of the territory which lies to the rear of the
army in the field” (Gramsci 1971: 234, Q13 §24). A war of position, must be carefully
considered, carefully planned. It is “concentrated, difficult, and requires exceptional qualities
of patience and inventiveness” (Gramsci 1971: 239, Q6 §117). And, as Howson argues, it is
never really complete. If a war of position leads to a situation of ethico-political hegemony,
then the maintenance of this hegemony is an on-going process, an ‘organic becoming’
(Howson 2005: 129). If aspirational hegemony, or ethico-political leadership, occurs through
consensus, then this is a consensus won in the realm of ideas as much as through material
practice. In this sense then, hegemony can not be separated from civil society.
Like all Gramscian concepts, ‘civil society’ and its relationship to a theory and practice of
hegemony is a contested notion (Bobbio 1979; Buttigieg 1995). In many cases, the focus on
the relationship between civil society and power at a formal state level has resulted in an
abstraction of the concept out from the theory of hegemony as a whole. In the worst case, the
tendency to theorise civil society as a separate sphere from the state results in the valorisation
of neo-liberal conceptions of freedom (Buttigieg 1995: 4-6). In Gramsci’s notion of the
‘integral state’ however, civil society does not sit separately from political society, but is
rather an essential component of the making of power, and thus, the challenging of that
power – the institution of a new, alternative ‘power’ (Howson 2005: 17). If hegemony is the
result of ethico-political leadership, then civil society is the site of that hegemony. Gramsci’s
concern then is to expand the terrain of civil society, to “develop a revolutionary strategy (a
‘war of position’) that would be employed precisely in the arena of civil society, with the aim
of disabling the coercive apparatus of the state, gaining access to political power, and creating
the conditions that would give rise to a consensual society wherein no individual or group is
reduced to a subaltern status” (Buttigieg 1995: 7).
The major innovation that Gramsci makes to our understanding of civil society, which make
it so important for a theory of hegemony, is the way in which he reconfigures the concept of
the ‘superstructural’ (Texier 1979). Whereas Marx posited a base/structure conception, with
civil society being the ‘superstructural’ site of historical development (but ultimately
‘determined’ by the base), Gramsci extends the distinction to argue that civil society is more
than just superstructural, but is the essential terrain of historical development. Instead of
justifying ideologies emerging from the base into the realm of civil society, for Gramsci the
‘ideas’ are contemporaneous, emerging in civil society, so that man acts on structures rather
than structures acting deterministically on man. Bobbio argues that “it is the active subject
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who recognises and pursues the end, and who operates within the superstructural phase using
the structure itself as an instrument. Therefore the structure is no longer the subordinating
moment of history, but it becomes the subordinate one” (Bobbio 1979: 34). In Gramsci’s
words: “Structure ceases to be an external force which crushes man, assimilates him to
himself and make him passive; and is transformed into a means of freedom, an instrument to
create a new ethico-political form and a source of new initiatives. To establish the ‘cathartic’
moment becomes therefore, it seems to me, the starting point for all the philosophy of praxis”
(Gramsci 1971: 367, Q10II §6i). This is the practice of hegemony, a hegemony that occurs in
the realm of ideas, in the “minds of men” (Gramsci 1971: 367, Q10II §6i). Thus, man is an
active subject, and the structures of human life do not exist separately from the thinking of
them, and so the question of consciousness, the nature of human subjectivity, is essential to
understanding society as it is, and what it can become.
If hegemony is constituted in civil society, and if civil society is superstructural, than the
means of civil society is language. Peter Ives’s recent work on language and hegemony has
shown the complexity of Gramsci’s thought on the topic of language, on linguistics, on its
relation to social practices and to the creation of a national-popular ‘sentiment’(Ives 2004a;
Ives 2004b; Ives 2005). This paper can not be a comprehensive analysis of Gramsci’s varied
approaches to the ‘questione della lingua’ but it does seek to make particular connections
between language and hegemony, linking language back to civil society and its role in the
construction of subjectivity. In a way, Gramsci makes this link himself:
We have established that philosophy is a conception of the world, and that philosophical
activity is not to be conceived solely as the ‘individual’ elaboration of systematically
coherent concepts, but also and above all as a cultural battle to transform the popular
‘mentality’ and to diffuse the philosophical innovations which will demonstrate themselves
to be ‘historically true’ to the extent that they become concretely – i.e. historically and
socially – universal. Given this, the question of language in general and of languages in the
technical sense must be put in the forefront of our enquiry.5

Three themes emerge from this paragraph. Firstly, that seemingly incoherent and non-rational
conceptions of the world are not to be dismissed in the analysis of society and history.
Secondly that these conceptions of the world, including the nature of self-identity, are
constructed and contested on the terrain of civil society, through language, in all its forms.
And thirdly, that this is the essence of the hegemonic process – the struggle over meaning,
over conceptions of the world, over what is normal, acceptable, truthful, ‘universal’ in social
relations. Of course, in an ethico-political hegemony, this ‘truth’ exists in the form of
unstable equilibria, where meaning is never settled, nor even universal, but firmly grounded
in the specific and particular conceptions of the world. In the philosophy of praxis, where the
aim is the ‘hegemony of the proletariat’ this is the process of ‘war of position’: the careful
and patient articulation of a conception of the world which does not disconnect groups or
5

Gramsci A. (1971). Selections from the Prison Notebooks. ed Q. Hoare and G. Nowell-Smith. London,
Lawrence and Wishart.p348. Q10II §44. The editors of the SPN have noted that ‘language’ for Gramsci here has
two meanings, lost in the English translation, which is the differentiation between language as a system of
verbal signs and language as the ‘faculty to transmit messages, verbal or otherwise, by means of a common
code”. Note 32, p. 348.
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individuals from power, where interests can be expressed and commonalities uncovered,
without the imposition of one corporate interest over all.
This issue of language is bound up with Gramsci’s thinking about the nature of philosophy
and its relation to what he called ‘common sense’, and the problem of how people made
sense of themselves, and their place in the world. In this sense then, there is a ‘subjective’
element to the theory of hegemony which often gets overlooked, but with which Gramsci was
intensely concerned. Gramsci saw clearly the potential for capitalism to reach right into the
heart of the human self, and his emphasis on the importance of understanding hegemony
through civil society is because he recognised the implications of hegemony for personal,
social and political life.
In his note on the “Problem of Collective Man”, for example, Gramsci wrote that the aim of
the state “is always that of creating new and higher types of civilization: of adapting the
civilization and the morality of the broadest popular masses to the necessities of the
continuous development of the economic apparatus of production: hence of evolving even
physically new types of humanity” (Gramsci 1971: 242, Q13 §7). This was not a simple
process, firstly because Gramsci saw quite clearly that people were not determined simply by
the economic circumstances into which they were born, rather people were made at the
intersection of many different influences on thought and action: “man cannot be conceived of
except as historically determined man – i.e., man who has developed, and who lives, in
certain conditions, in a particular social complex or totality of social relations” (Gramsci
1971: 244, Q15 §10) and that this social totality consists of the variety of influences and
associations which are sometimes contradictory (Gramsci 1971: 265, Q14 §13) but which all
contribute to the formulation of a particular conception of the world (Gramsci 1971: 324,
Q11 §12). Secondly he argued that people were still free to choose their way of being in the
world and that this complicated the matter further, that is “the will and initiative of men
themselves can not be left out of account” (Gramsci 1971: 244, Q15 §10). In the same way
that Marx argued that men made themselves but not in circumstances of their own choosing,
so Gramsci was aware of the tension between structures and human agency. But for Gramsci,
the situation is more complex because of the importance he gave to the dialectic in
hegemony. While it may be the case that a particular hegemony may require a particular kind
of person, it is also true that people themselves shape hegemony: “Every man, in as much as
he is active, i.e. living, contributes to modify the social environment in which he develops (to
modifying certain of its characteristics or to preserving others); in other words, he tends to
establish “norms”, rules of living and of behaviour” (Gramsci 1971: 265, Q14 §13) and in so
doing “reacts upon the State and the party, compelling them to reorganize continually and
confronting them with new and original problems to solve” (Gramsci 1971: 267, Q17 §51).
In some notes on “The Study of Philosophy”, Gramsci differentiates however, between ways
of thinking and being which he classifies as common sense as opposed to philosophy. If
common sense is the world view which a person takes uncritically from their environment,
philosophy is the ability to be self-reflective, self-critical:
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is it better to think, without having a critical awareness, in a disjointed and episodic
way?...to take part in a conception of the world mechanically imposed by some external
environment, i.e., by the many social groups in which everyone is automatically involved
from the moment of his entry into the conscious world…or...is it better to work out
consciously and critically one’s own conception of the world and thus, in connection with
the labours of one’s own brain, choose one’s sphere of activity, be one’s own guide,
refusing to accept passively and supinely from outside the moulding of one’s personality?
(Gramsci 1971: 323-324, Q11 §12)

Gramsci shows here an understanding of the complex forces that go into the making of
human subjectivity. More than this, he recognises that subjectivity, consciousness, is key to
action. Through questioning the range of possible identifications presented to individuals
from the outside, Gramsci sees here the potentials for the questioning of normativity, and for
a radical re-energising of the human self. The individual must start from this level of selfknowledge, self-awareness, and move outwards in ways that challenge neat categorisations.
In a detached or dominative hegemonic situation, challenges to meaning are always closed
down – transformed or eradicated. Conceptions of the world are restricted and limited by the
grammar of the dominant group, creating exclusion and subalternity. For this reason,
Gramsci was intensely interested in groups that were considered problematic for the
dominant, or mainstream, society, and this emphasis on collective alternative subjectivity
formed the basis of his work on subalternity.
Subalternity and subjectivity
Like the other Gramscian concepts explored here, the concept of subalternity is a
contested and appropriated one (Green 2000), for some authors coming to be synonymous
with either the peasantry or the proletariat.6 While it is true that Gramsci did refer to the
proletariat as ‘subaltern’ this was not the only group he analysed under this rubric. His most
famous analysis of subalternity is the millenarian sect of Davide Lazzaretti and the way in
which bourgeois journalists like Bulferetti and the criminologist Lombroso dealt with this
group, which he saw as the epitome of ‘intellectual’ attitudes towards subalternity. That is:
instead of studying the origins of a collective event and the reasons why it spread, the
reasons why it was collective, the protagonist was singled out and one limited oneself to
writing a pathological biography, all too often starting off from motives that had not been
confirmed or that could be interpreted differently. For a social elite, the members of
subaltern groups always have something of a barbaric or pathological nature about them.7

6

Examples of each include Spivak G. C. (1988). Can the subaltern speak? Marxism and the interpretation of
culture. ed. C. Nelson and L. Grossberg. Urbana, University of Illinois Press: 271-313. and Guha R. (1982).
Subaltern Studies I: Writings on South Asian history and society. Oxford University Press, Delhi.
7
Gramsci A. (1996). Prison Notebooks Volume II. trans and ed Joseph Buttigieg. New York, Columbia
University Press.Q3 §12. See also Gramsci A. (1975). Quaderni del Carcere. ed. Valentino Gerratana. Torino,
G. Einaudi. Q25 §1. A detailed socio-political analysis of Lazzaretti can be found in Hobsbawm E. (1965).
Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the 19th and 20th Centuries. W.W. Norton &
Co., New York. pp. 65-73.
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Particularly annoying to Gramsci is Lombroso’s ‘scienticism’, or the biological determinism
with which he analysed ‘criminality’. This is particularly disturbing considering Lombroso’s
“leftist” orientation, which is indicative to Gramsci, and should be for us, of the state of leftist
intellectuals whose valorisation of reason, rationality and science contribute to the
construction of subalternity.8 This is an important point – in a hegemonic process that is
based on consent, the ‘reformist’ attitude of left social and political groups can make them
actively complicit with a hegemony operating though civil society, thus closing down
avenues for the expression of alternative hegemonies that are articulated in subalternity.
When it comes to the representation of subalternity, Green argues, “Gramsci was concerned
with how literary representations of the subaltern reinforced the subaltern’s subordinated
position…In historical or literary documents, the subaltern may be presented as humble,
passive or ignorant, but their actual lived experience may prove the contrary. Hence, the
integral historian has to analyse critically the way in which intellectuals represent the
conditions and aspirations of the subaltern” (Green 2000: 15). It is for this reason that the
study of subaltern groups, in all their particularity, is of such importance for Gramsci. Thus,
his interest in them is threefold: “he was interested in producing a methodology of subaltern
historiography, a history of the subaltern classes, and a political strategy of transformation
based upon the historical development and existence of the subaltern” (Green 2000: 3). In
concrete historical situations, most hegemonies create and maintain subalternity, especially in
the protection of hegemonic principles. Yet there is no possibility of an alternative hegemony
without the involvement of subaltern groups. If Gramsci’s project was to involve subaltern
groups in a war of position on the terrain of civil society, then he was particularly concerned
as to how subalternity was created through civil society in the first place.
Gramsci’s concept of subalternity is most often used for an analysis of a group’s position, and
in these analyses subalternity is usually assumed to be a negative condition, based on a lack,
that needs to be overcome by a confrontation with the structures of power. Yet this paper has
argued that there is more to subalternity, and to a Gramscian conceptualisation of relations of
power more generally, than this. Gramsci was keenly aware of the ways in which people
were made, and made themselves, in relation to the circumstances in which they were born,
and that in so doing they immediately affected those circumstances. Subalternity was not
always a state of victimhood but was made so more often by historians or theorists who
sought to impose pre-existing categories of analysis onto situations. In this scenario, subaltern
groups are depoliticised or decontextualised. This way of thinking overlooks the subtleties in
Gramsci’s theory of hegemony, in which, if real social change is to occur, subalternity must
be understood in its specific historical context, and the processes by which it is produced and
reproduced exposed. To do so, it is essential to understand the ways in which people come to
see themselves as subaltern, and to look for the ways in which they resist these sorts of power
8

Gramsci A. (1992). Prison Notebooks Volume I. trans J. Buttigieg and A. Callarri. Ed Joseph Buttigieg. New
York, Columbia University Press.pp. 116-117, Q1 §27. See also Gramsci A. (1975). Quaderni del Carcere. ed.
Valentino Gerratana. Torino, G. Einaudi.Q25, §8 and Buttigieg J. A. (1992). Introduction. Prison Notebooks Vol
I. New York, Columbia University Press.pp. 46-49. and Green M. (2000). "Gramsci Cannot Speak:
Presentations and Interpretations of Gramsci's Concept of the Subaltern." Rethinking Marxism 14(3): 1-24.pp.
14-15.

45

Gramsci at the Margins

relations in everyday life. It can be argued then, that there is a strong link between
subalternity and subjectivity, and this is particularly evident when we study in detail the way
in which subaltern groups are classified and analysed in their own time. While Gramsci
warned against making subaltern groups into individual pathologies, he was also aware of the
ways in which subalternity could be constructed around particular personality traits and that
values, or morality, were strongly related to changing social and economic circumstances.
Gramsci made some headway in this line of thinking with his ideas about common sense,
philosophy and personality formation, but there are limits to how far he could, and would,
push his theories in this direction.
As is the case in a lot of historical and political writing on the left, there are some issues with
the way in which Gramsci theorised alternative ways of being in the world. The traditional
Marxist way of theorising marginality has been to categorise the ‘deviant’ as
‘lumpenproletariat’, to see them as somehow less than human, the refuse thrown up class
struggle. The tendency to demonise such people comes from an intellectual preference for the
recognisably political.9 People who do not organise themselves, who do not actively seek to
change their circumstances, or seem to prefer a life on the margins, are often accused of
‘false consciousness’ or dismissed for their alleged stupidity and passivity. In his writings
about subalternity, Gramsci makes some very good points about the intellectual errors that
can be made by judging some forms of social organisation by their appearances, rather than
by attempting to discover their root cause, but it is still the case that he saw subalternity as a
position to be overcome. As sensitive and nuanced a thinker as he was, he still privileged the
rational over the non-rational. As the American academic Frank Wilderson notes, the
Gramscian subject is, by and large, the white male worker. Relations of oppression are seen
to happen largely within the paradigm of the capital-labour relation, and thus forms of
resistance which occur within this paradigm are automatically privileged. He suggests
“exploitation (wage slavery) is the only category of oppression which concerns Gramsci:
society, Western society, thrives on the exploitation of the Gramscian subject. Full stop.”
(Wilderson 2003: 231). While we can not exactly chastise Gramsci for what he did not write
about, Wilderson’s point is a valid one to the extent that it points out that there is an absence
in the theory of hegemony as resistance because not only is it based on white rationality (the
articulation or organisation of consent) but it does not account for the silent, or non rational
forms of resistance. Given the immediate historical and political situation with which
Gramsci was confronted, the focus on class struggle means that there is a limit in Gramsci as
to what might constitute human freedom.
9

For an extensive analysis of the concept of the lumpenproletariat in Marxist thinking see, for example, Fanon
F. (1965). The Wretched of the Earth. Grove Press, New York, Draper H. (1972). "The Concept of the
Lumpenproletariat in Marx and Engels." Economies et Societies 15(Dec): 2285-2312, Bovenkerk F. (1984).
"The Rehabilitation of the Rabble: How and why Marx and Engels wrongly depicted the lumpenproletariat as a
reactionary force." Netherlands Journal of Sociology 20(April): 13-41, Bussard R. L. (1987). "The 'Dangerous
Class' of Marx and Engels" The rise of the idea of the lumpenproletariat." History of European Ideas 8(6): 675692, Hayes P. (1988). "Utopia and the lumpenproletariat: Marx's reasoning in the Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis
Bonaparte." Review of Politics 50(3): 445-465, Stallybrass P. (1990). "Marx and Heterogeneity: Thinking the
Lumpenproletariat." Representations 31(Summer): 69-95.
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While it is the case that the idea of resistance is implicit in the theory of hegemony, it is still
also the case that Gramsci, and many contemporary theorists, privilege certain types of
resistance over others. In historical and political writing in particular, the emphasis on
organised political collectives has resulted in these coming to be taken as the only legitimate
form of resistance, and that those who do not resist in this way are not seen as resisting at all,
or are seen as taking energy away from a ‘true’ revolutionary cause. It is a valid point to
argue that real social change seems only possible where there is collective action, but this
should not negate the power of the individual, who is ultimately the first site of resistance,
nor should it negate actions that do not fit in with a predetermined idea of what resistance
looks like. If hegemony operates at many levels of personal life, then it is important that we
consider that resistance can take place here as well. In this sense, we need to deepen and
reconfigure what we mean by resistance and to broaden our understanding of the possible
forms of human agency.

Rather than relying on the structures and institutions of economic relations to tell us how
people are ‘made’ in the world, a consideration of the ‘subjective’ adds depth and complexity
to the ‘problem’ of identity. The point here is to see what we can learn about capitalist
hegemony, by shifting the lens slightly from an emphasis on the politics of collective action
to that of the personal. Subjectivity as an object of analysis can be related to broader issues of
social formation through a theory of hegemony which does not consider hegemony as mere
domination, but explores the multiple influences on human thought and action, as Gramsci
suggested. That is, human beings are made at the intersection of various social relations
which include family, location, religion, work and culture. In more recent times this can be
expanded to include relations along axes such as sexuality, gender, ethnicity, race, age and
subcultures, or specific cultural interests or identifications. In this sense then, people are not
determined by a particular set of social relations, but are overdetermined by a number of
causes, none of which can be separated from each other, nor can one be pinpointed as
decisive. While at certain points in history, the range of identifications may have been
smaller, or more limited, and ‘decisive’ points perhaps easier to identify, we should be
careful about assuming that people in the past were more ‘simple’ than we are, or did not
struggle about a sense of self in the way that we do. The forms in which they did so may have
been different, but it is not necessarily the case that the processes were vastly different, that
is, it is not simply the case that people were more easily determined by ideology in the past
than they are today. Historical ‘evidence’ itself tells us that hegemony has always been a
process of conflict and struggle, and that this conflict often took place at the level of the
subjective. Human nature, the human self, has always been the terrain of conflict because it is
first and foremost human beings who constitute social relations – these relations are not made
by some invisible hand of god, or even of capitalists, without either the consensus or coercion
of people themselves.
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In this sense then, the greatest battle of hegemony has been on the terrain of consciousness,
and it is because of this that Gramsci spent so much of his intellectual energy on attempting
to understand language, culture and common sense. It is only possible for a system of social
relations to become truly hegemonic, not merely dominative, if it has been successful in
winning the hearts and minds of people at an everyday level. This is not simply the
determinism of the means of production which people do not understand, or the determinism
of ideology operating as false consciousness. If this were the case, there would be no conflict
and marginalised groups would not exist. The fact that there is always resistance points to the
capacity of humans to see clearly the choices with which they were faced, and to act
accordingly.
Gramsci argues that ‘true’ hegemony resides in the process of a war of position. The idea that
revolution lies in a war of movement has been proven false in theory and in practice, not least
because a war of movement, in a frontal attack on the state, does not have a basis in
leadership and consent through which power is maintained, but also because a war of
movement does little more than ape the tactics of the enemy. If capitalist social relations seek
to act on the heart of the self, and to exclude from political engagement those groups who do
not conform to the new hegemonic principles, than to dismiss or overlook groups who resist
at this particular level is to dismiss and overlook potentials for a truly organic hegemony.
More than this, it is to overlook the fact that capitalist social relations have bought about a
complete transformation in ways of thinking and being in the world to the extent that
alternatives become unthinkable, and reformism remains the norm. Many of us are wary of
individualism and identity politics, and sometimes for good reason, but if we continue to
ignore the way in which capitalism seeks to transform human nature itself, we will continue
to ignore possibilities for real social change.
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